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Abstract
Traders in global markets operate at different local times-of-day. This implies 
het-erogeneity in circadian timing and likely sleepiness or alertness of those 
traders operating at less or more optimal times of the day, respectively. This, in 
turn, may lead to differences in both individual-level trader behavior as well as 
market level outcomes. We examined these factors by administering single-
location and global sessions of an online asset market experiment that regularly 
produces mispricing and valuation bubbles. Global sessions involved real time 
trades between subjects in New Zealand and the U.S (i.e., “global” markets) with 
varied local times of day for each location. Individual traders at suboptimal times 
of day (or, “circadian mis-matched” traders) engaged in riskier trading strategies, 
such as holding shares (the riskier asset) in later trading rounds and mispricing 
shares to a greater degree. These strategies resulted in lower earnings for 
circadian mismatched traders, especially in heterogeneous markets that also 
included traders at more optimal times-of-day. These differences were also 
reflected in market level outcomes. Markets with higher circadian mismatch 
heterogeneity across traders were more likely to exhibit longer lasting asset 
bubbles and greater share turnover volume. Overall, our results draw attention to 
a unique, but underappreciated, factor present across traders in global market 
environments, namely, differences in sleepiness across traders. Thus, this study 
hopes to highlight the role of circadian mismatch in attempting to understand 
trader behavior and, ultimately, market volatility.
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1 Introduction
Globalization, along with its impact on diverse aspects of our lives, has also led to 
the creation of global financial markets (e.g., markets for foreign exchange, treasur-
ies, commodities and crypto-currencies). Such markets involve traders who are geo-
graphically dispersed in real time. It is now common-place for a trader in Tokyo to 
engage in markets located in, London, New York or elsewhere. This raises an under-
appreciated issue with implications regarding asset pricing in such global markets, 
and this issue will likely become more prominent with increasing globalization 
and improving technology. Specifically, the presence of globally dispersed traders 
implies heterogeneity in the local time-of-day for those traders and, consequently, 
increased circadian-driven sleepiness/alertness heterogeneity across these market 
participants.
The issue of how trader heterogeneity may impact market-level outcomes or asset 
mispricing is an important one that has received considerable attention in the litera-
ture (De Long et al. 1990; Griffin et al. 2011; Baghestanian et al. 2015; Akiyama 
et al. 2017; Hanaki et al. 2017).1 Related to our topic is previous research that has 
identified “circadian desynchronosis” as a cause of the negative effect of daylight 
savings time (DST) changes on stock returns (Kamstra et al. 2000). However, our 
research question is different in that we examine how differences in circadian sleep/
wake rhythm across asset market traders affects asset mispricing. Because of the 
heterogeneity in the circadian timing of decisions among participants in real-time 
global markets, those trading at more suboptimal local times of day (e.g., traders 
operating at 4:00 am), who can be thought of as those with significant “circadian 
mismatch”, may be at particular disadvantage when high level thinking and anticipa-
tion become crucial. Therefore, we hypothesize that global markets generate a natu-
ral heterogeneity in critical cognitive resource availability that may impact trader 
behavior and market outcomes in important ways.
Observational data presents numerous challenges in any attempt to establish 
causal relationships when considering a question like this: how does heteroge-
neity in circadian patterns affect individual and market level outcomes? There 
is some evidence that dual-listed financial securities exhibit more volatility on 
global markets compared to domestic markets that are closed to foreign traders. 
For example, Chinese American Depository Receipts (ADRs) exhibit higher vol-
atility than their domestically-listed counterparts (Chen et al. 2010; He and Yang 
2012; Wu and Chen 2015; Liu 2017).2 While securities listed on the NYSE can 
be purchased by domestic and foreign traders operating at different local times, 
Chinese stock exchanges are only open to local traders operating within the same 
1 A recent paper by Hanaki et al. (2017) finds a significant increase in asset mispricing in experimental 
asset markets with both high and low cognitive ability subjects, which may also implicate temporary 
variations in available cognitive resources as a source of asset mispricing and market bubbles.
2 An American depositary (or depository) receipt (ADR) represents securities of a foreign company that 
trade in U.S. financial markets. These are denominated and pay dividends  in U.S. dollars  and may be 
traded like regular shares of stock. They are traded during U.S. trading hours.
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time zone. A reasonable conjecture is that excess volatility in ADR trading is the 
result of globally located ADR trader activity—some of these traders are operat-
ing at more sub-optimal times of day relative to other traders in the market.
With this field data example, the asset underlying the US-listed ADR and the 
domestically-listed share is the same and, because the renminbi/USD exchange 
rate is fixed, we believe that this as close as we can get to a natural experiment 
with observational data.
These results suggest that market level outcomes may differ when there is 
greater heterogeneity in the circadian state of traders, and this is the theme we 
wish to explore in a more controlled setting. Another example is provided by 
Gao et  al. (2018), who identify statistically and economically significant differ-
ences in intraday patterns for returns on exchange-traded funds; returns in the 
final 30 min of the day matched returns in the first 30 min. The authors suggest 
that this effect is driven primarily by late informed (or slow to process informa-
tion) buyers who take several hours to process new information. Adverse sleep 
states have been shown to compromise the processing of new information (e.g., 
Dickinson and Drummond 2008; Dickinson et al. 2016), and so a given percent-
age of sleepy traders in a market may generate such a data pattern as in Gao et al. 
(2018). Unfortunately, data from these naturally occurring market examples pose 
complications in cleanly identifying any singular mechanism. Therefore, gener-
ating primary data in a controlled laboratory environment is a way to minimize 
potential confounding factors. We therefore consider this research an important 
first step in our attempt to understand the importance of circadian heterogeneity, 
and likely heterogeneity in sleepiness in general, in real-time global markets.
We study a commonly used (and well-validated) experimental asset market 
environment to examine asset pricing and trader decisions. Research on how cir-
cadian timing affects behavior in strategic environments, in general, is particu-
larly lacking. Our results show that the circadian suboptimal state of a trader pre-
dicts riskier trading strategies (i.e., holding shares, the riskier asset, longer and 
mispricing the shares more) and reduced earnings. Further, we show that these 
phenomena of riskier trading strategies and lower earnings of circadian mis-
matched traders are particularly exacerbated in markets that have a greater degree 
of circadian mismatch heterogeneity. In other words, it is not enough for all trad-
ers in a market to be operating at sub-optimal times of day (say, 4:00 am). What 
is crucial is the presence of both circadian matched (those at more optimal times-
of-day) and circadian mismatched traders, which allows the former to exploit the 
“mistakes” of the latter. Finally, we demonstrate that the heterogeneity in this cir-
cadian state across traders in a market may manifest itself in aggregate market 
level outcomes such as bubble duration and asset turnover volume. A key insight 
of our study is that global markets (that bring together traders operating at dif-
ferent local times of the day) are far more likely to generate the type of circadian 
mismatch heterogeneity that is crucial for greater mispricing and lower earnings 
for traders operating at sub-optimal times of day. To our knowledge, this paper 
is the first to systematically examine the impact of this feature of globalization 
(i.e., heterogeneity in circadian mismatch) on trader behavior and asset market 
outcomes.
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2  Background
In general, unimpaired cognition would seem necessary for successful asset market 
performance. This would implicate one’s ability to engage prefrontal brain regions 
that are important in high-level executive function. Deliberative thinking processes 
may also be important for limiting the influence of cognitive biases in such decision 
environments, such as trader overconfidence. Evidence shows that those scoring 
higher at Theory of Mind (ToM) skills exhibit increased medial Prefrontal Cortex 
activation (mPFC) and are better at predicting prices in asset markets with insid-
ers (Bruguier et al. 2010). Relatedly, researchers have found that mentalizing during 
strategic interactions (Hampton et al. 2008) invokes regions of the brain known to 
be impacted by sleep deprivation (Yoo et al. 2007). Though brain regions implicated 
in ToM appear to be distinct from those involved in mathematical calculations, the 
fact remains that successful anticipation of future market outcomes involves higher 
levels of cognitive reasoning implicated in ToM (Coricelli and Nagel 2009). Oth-
ers have reported that both analytical and mentalizing dimensions of cognition are 
required for successful trading behavior (Hefti et al. 2016; Corgnet et al. 2018).3
A different strand of research has examined the importance of behavioral biases, 
such as overconfidence, on trader performance. For example, Michailova and 
Schmidt (2016) found that overconfidence led to larger price bubbles and such 
overconfidence was larger in the latter half of the 15-round asset market (see also 
Kirchler and Maciejovsky 2002). Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) offered a theoreti-
cal argument based on the idea that traders may be willing to pay more than their 
expectation of an asset’s future dividend value as long as one believes another trader 
will subsequently be willing to pay even more.4
The connections between mentalizing (ToM), overconfidence, and asset market 
behavior are important given the results in the sleep literature. Specifically, neuro-
imaging studies have shown that sleep loss disproportionately impacts prefrontal 
and executive function brain regions (Horne 1993; Muzur et  al. 2002; Chee and 
Chuah 2008), and behavioral research has shown that anticipation of other’s choices 
can be harmed even at relatively mild levels of circadian mismatch (Dickinson and 
McElroy 2012). Furthermore, sleep researchers have found a recent neural basis 
for claiming that mild sleep restriction may increase optimism by accentuating the 
brain’s focus on positive reward anticipation (Venkatraman et al. 2011).5 In a recent 
3 A recent paper by Corgnet et  al. (2018) also concludes that standard cognitive skills are not neces-
sarily what make traders successful, but rather display of behavioral biases such as overconfidence may 
be a stronger indicator of poor performance in asset markets. However, they also conclude that ToM 
skills have only a marginal effect, which is different than what others have concluded (e.g., Bruguier 
et al. 2010).
4 Others have found that overconfidence in equity trading data may result in higher frequency trading 
activity (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2009).
5 More specifically, to the extent that sleep deprivation may selectively increase activation in portions 
of the prefrontal cortex (i.e., the ventro-medial PFC), the evidence suggests that such increased activa-
tion represents the decision maker’s increased focus on potential monetary gains. In other words, in the 
context of our task where monetary gains and losses are at stake, the increased PFC activation that may 
result from sleepy traders would suggest an increased optimism bias as opposed to an increase in deci-
sion quality (see Venkatraman et al. 2007, 2009, 2011).
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paper, Castillo et al. (2017) also found a direct link between suboptimal circadian 
timing and riskier asset bundle choices in an individual decision-making environ-
ment. This finding adds “increased preference for risk” to the potential mechanisms 
that may be engaged in “sleepier” traders. Taken together, prior findings suggest 
that sleepiness, in a general sense, is linked to a reduced capacity to anticipate, an 
increased preference for risk, and the increased potential for optimism in relevant 
decision environments.6 This has the potential to increase asset mispricing, espe-
cially if there is significant circadian heterogeneity in the market such that “alert” 
traders are able to exploit the reduced anticipation (or increased overconfidence or 
risk taking) of “sleepy”(“tired”) traders. Our premise is that such heterogeneity is 
likely to be higher in global markets.
3  Hypotheses
The research summarized above supports a set of hypotheses regarding market out-
comes and individual behavior in markets with greater heterogeneity in circadian 
mismatch across traders. Specifically, heterogeneity in mentalizing skills (i.e., one’s 
ability to anticipate), overconfidence, and risk attitude will be higher in markets with 
greater heterogeneity in circadian mismatch if, as we assume, suboptimal times-of-
day impact these behavioral tendencies. As noted above, we expect this to be more 
likely in our global market sessions (henceforth, “global markets”), but we will base 
our hypotheses on a more precise measure of market-level heterogeneity as indi-
cated in the Experimental Design section below.7 Sleepy traders, in the presence of 
more alert traders, may fuel valuation bubbles: they fail to anticipate overvaluation 
(or a market “crash”) and continue mispricing the asset; they are overly optimistic 
regarding price trends during bubbles, and/or they display an increased preference 
for the risk inherent in holding asset shares with uncertain value. The presence of 
less-sleepy traders (i.e., lesser degree of circadian mismatch) in those same mar-
kets provides the opposing tendencies to fuel bilateral trades. This leads to our first 
hypothesis, which focuses on aggregate market level outcomes.
6 Altered mood states may also be a factor to consider, as previous authors have hypothesized that 
mood may explain morning sunshine impacts on stock market returns, which may otherwise be diffi-
cult to reconcile with a rational expectations model (Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003). Yet another study 
in experimental asset markets suggests irrationality of traders may fuel speculative bubbles (Lei et  al. 
2001), though we appeal to a recent asset bundle choice experiment that found mild circadian mismatch 
may impact preferred asset bundles with no measurable change in rationality of choice (see Castillo et al. 
2017).
7 Some studies such as Toplak et  al. (2011), which rely on the Frederick (2005) Cognitive Reflection 
Task (CRT), suggest that behavioral differences are driven primarily by differences in cognitive skills. 
Therefore, we include a control for math abilities in our analysis. While we do not measure CRT in the 
present study, a related study (Castillo et al, 2017) measures CRT in an individual decision asset bundle 
choice task under conditions of circadian match and mismatch and found no significant difference in 
CRT scores across these randomly assigned treatment groups.
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Hypothesis 1 Markets with greater circadian mismatch heterogeneity will produce 
more significant asset price bubbles.
Our second hypothesis focuses on individual trader behavior. A premise of our 
hypotheses is the fact that we predict circadian mismatch increases preference 
for riskier asset bundles (i.e., more shares over cash), increases overconfidence, 
and reduces a trader’s ability to anticipate others’ actions (e.g., hold shares while 
others are selling). Recent results in Castillo et al. (2017) support this hypothesis 
over the alternative (and perhaps common) intuition that sleepy decision makers 
are more irrational. While increased irrationality may be true at more acute levels 
of sleepiness, such as those generated by total sleep deprivation or chronic and 
severe sleep restriction, the circadian mismatch generated sleepiness we induce is 
more in line with the Castillo et al. (2017) approach.
Relatedly, extant research highlights the potential for increased optimism 
regarding favorable monetary outcomes. So, traders at suboptimal times of day 
may continue to optimistically overprice the asset and choose to hold more assets 
in anticipation of favorable dividend draws or resale prices. Or, they may simply 
be less able to anticipate the bubble burst in a state of greater circadian mismatch. 
It is common knowledge that shares are redeemed at fundamental value at the end 
of the last market trading round and so all bubbles eventually crash, at least in 
terms of final redemption prices. Assuming one’s expected ability to resell shares 
at a profit should decrease in the number of remaining trading rounds, holding 
shares in late trading rounds would be a riskier strategy for traders even in the flat 
fundamental share value setting we use. We summarize this conjecture, that cir-
cadian mismatched traders will employer riskier trading strategies, in our second 
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 Circadian mismatched traders will employ riskier trading strategies: 
(1) they will hold more shares particularly in later trading rounds (a riskier strategy);
and (2) they will misprice shares to a greater degree than more circadian matched
traders.
Finally, we explore earnings differences across trader types. Reduced mentaliz-
ing or increased overconfidence among circadian mismatched traders should imply 
poorer decisions that may be exploited by more circadian matched traders and result 
in lower earnings. Increased risk taking, per se, may or may not impact average 
trader earnings, and so differences in earnings in our design may reflect more the 
impact that circadian timing has on anticipation or overconfidence (i.e., inaccurate 
beliefs). Though we do not collect direct evidence on beliefs, lower earnings of 
sleepy traders would be indirect evidence that circadian suboptimal timing impacts 
the quality of trader decisions that typically depend on the accuracy of one’s beliefs. 
We highlight the predicted effect on earnings as our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Circadian mismatched traders will earn less. This effect will be largest 
in markets with higher circadian heterogeneity.
532 D. L. Dickinson et al.
1 3
4  Experimental design
The limit-order asset market environment we implement is based on the constant 
(flat) fundamental asset value design of Bostian et al. (2005) and Bostian and Holt 
(2009). Groups of 7–13 subjects (median group size = 11 subjects) participated in 
the online asset market experiment. Participants (n = 303) from both New Zealand 
and the U.S. were recruited for this study. Recruitment was from University popula-
tions in both locations, and there were no exclusion criteria other than the restriction 
that participants be at least 18 years of age. Participants were not asked to come into 
a physical lab and could participate from any web-access location of their choice. 
Subjects were recruited for 2-h sessions that required them to be online at specific 
local time-of-day on the day of the session, and they were paid a fixed payment that 
varied depending on the local time of day of the session (see note to Table 1).8 Ses-
sions were scheduled so that all subjects participated on either a Tuesday, Wednes-
day, Thursday (no matter which location) to avoid weekend sleep effects as much as 
possible. We anticipated that those participating during nighttime hours would likely 
participate from their homes, which also constituted a risk management feature of 
the design (i.e., no sleepy travel required, and participants could sleep immediately 
after participation, if desired).
Subjects were instructed that, at the session start time, the experimenter would 
email a link to a short (5 min) online survey to collect demographic and self-report 
sleep data, as well as a validated measure of “morningness” or “eveningness” prefer-
ences (Adan and Almirall 1991). Self-reported sleepiness was elicited in the survey 
to validate our methodology. The experimenter monitored survey responses in real 
time to verify total logins, and this determined the final group size used to then con-
figure the online asset market experiment.9
Experiments were conducted through Veconlab’s limit-order asset market experi-
ment option10 and the subjects were told that they would be emailed the login cre-
dentials for the main market experiment shortly after completion of the initial online 
survey. The market is a call auction mechanism where traders may choose to sub-
mit orders to buy and/or sell shares in a series of trading rounds. Traders were also 
allowed to submit an order to buy or sell zero shares, which the experimenter asked 
they do rather than do nothing so that the experimenter was more assured that the 
online traders had not abandoned the experiment. Within the asset market experi-
ment, the experimenter utilized a message board embedded in the program to post 
messages to subjects individually or as a group (e.g., “30  s until the round ends, 
please make your final decisions for this round”). The experimenter also contin-
ued to monitor email in the event a subject sent a clarification question because the 
8 Rates of subjects who signed up but were not online for the experiment (i.e., virtual no-shows) were as 
follows: 4 am—20%; 8 am—12.5%; noon—15.6%; 4 pm—20%; 8 pm—11%; midnight—24%.
9 The experimenter conducted the experiments online and was in the same time zone as the east coast 
US subjects.
10 The various experiment options for the Veconlab Internet-based platform for experiments can be 
accessed at http://vecon lab.econ.virgi nia.edu/admin .htm. The specific experiment used is the “Limit 
Order Market” option under the “Asset Market” submenu of the “Finance/Macro” experiment section.
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message feature in the asset market experiment was unidirectional (experimenter to 
subject(s) only). Questions to the experimenter were, however, minimal given the 
Veconlab instructional pages included comprehension examples of how transac-
tions were determined, and earnings calculated prior to allowing the subject to enter 
Table 1  Experiment locations, local times, and number of participants
Market 
session #
Global 
or local
Session details 
Total number of subjects
Place-24 h time [#obs at relevant 
location(s)]
Circadian GINI ∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 �xi−xj�
2n
∑n
i=1
xi
Circadian  
mismatch, xi,  
heterogeneity  
measure 
2
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 �xi−xj�
n(n−1)
Overall 
level of 
circadian 
mismatch 
4
∑n
i=1
xi
n−1
1 Local 9; NZ-12:00 (n = 9) 0.114 0.122 1.070
2 Global 11; NZ-24:00 (n = 5) & US-8:00 (n = 6) 0.124 0.300 2.424
3 Global 11; NZ-4:00 (n = 6) & US-12:00 (n = 5) 0.143 0.341 2.377
4 Global 9; NZ-8:00 (n = 4) & US-16:00 (n = 5) 0.198 0.334 1.690
5 Global 12; NZ-20:00 (n = 7) & US-4:00 (n = 5) 0.249 0.388 1.556
6 Global 11; NZ-12:00 (n = 5) & US-20:00 (n = 6) 0.198 0.119 0.600
7 Global 9; NZ-16:00 (n = 5) & US-24:00 (n = 4) 0.096 0.076 0.785
8 Local 10; NZ-12:00 (n = 10) 0.115 0.126 1.102
9 Global 11; NZ-24:00 (n = 5) & US-8:00 (n = 6) 0.180 0.401 2.224
10 Global 11, NZ-4:00 (n = 6) & US-12:00 (n = 5) 0.145 0.325 2.248
11 Global 10; NZ-8:00 (n = 4) & US-16:00 (n = 6) 0.187 0.232 1.238
12 Global 12; NZ-20:00 (n = 7) & US-4:00 (n = 5) 0.234 0.377 1.611
13 Global 10; NZ-12:00 (n = 5) & US-20:00 (n = 5) 0.181 0.094 0.520
14 Global 10; NZ-16:00 (n = 6) & US-24:00 (n = 4) 0.125 0.105 0.838
15 Local 13; US-12:00 (n = 13) 0.113 0.102 0.900
16 Local 12; US-12:00 (n = 12) 0.123 0.168 1.371
17 Local 7; US-4:00 (n = 7) 0.013 0.047 3.601
18 Local 8; US-20:00 (n = 8) 0.152 0.066 0.433
19 Local 10; US-4:00 (n = 10) 0.013 0.043 3.418
20 Local 11; US-20:00 (n = 11) 0.096 0.032 0.336
21 Local 11; US-20:00 (n = 11) 0.103 0.034 0.328
22 Local 12; US-20:00 (n = 12) 0.035 0.010 0.276
23 Local 8; US-4:00 (n = 8) 0.013 0.043 3.383
24 Local 10; US-20:00 (n = 10) 0.138 0.055 0.399
25 Local 11; US-4:00 (n = 11) 0.015 0.049 3.329
26 Local 10; US-4:00 (n = 10) 0.014 0.049 3.383
27 Local 9; NZ-20:00 (n = 9) 0.026 0.008 0.295
28 Local 12; NZ-20:00 (n = 12) 0.144 0.061 0.424
29 Local 13; NZ-20:00 (n = 13) 0.131 0.047 0.356
Global vs Local Mann–Whitney statistic (p value) − 3.612 
(p < .01)
− 3.898 
(p < .01)
− 1.107 
(p < .27)
Fixed payments for participation was $10 for sessions at local times of noon or 4:00 pm; $20 for sessions 
at local times of 8:00 am, 8:00 pm, or midnight; $30 for sessions at local times of 4:00 am. Additional 
earnings were based on outcomes in the asset market
Bold values indicate significance at the 5% or better level for the Mann-Whitney test
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the first market decision round (see online supplementary materials for experiment 
instructions).
In the experimental asset market, subjects were endowed with $50 of experi-
mental cash and 6 shares of the experimental asset. Two treatments varied the asset 
returns in a way that preserved a constant fundamental asset value of $7 in all round 
of all treatments. Specifically, in the Low Returns treatment, cash held at the end 
of each round received 10% interest, and in each round, shares earned a dividend 
of either $0.40 or $1.00 (so, the expected dividend was $.70 per round in Low 
Returns) and shares were redeemed for $7.00 at the end of the final period of the 
treatment. As such, the fundamental share value is found by the simplified perpetu-
ity formula $.70/.10 = $7.00 (see Holt et al. 2017 for the justification of a flat fun-
damental value design for the asset market).11 In the High Returns treatment, cash 
paid 20% interest but the dividend draw on shares in each round was either $1.10 or 
$1.70, which resulted in an expected dividend draw of $1.40 in each round. Conse-
quently, High Returns infused more cash into the market, which has been shown to 
amplify bubble formation (Holt et al. 2017), but the fundamental share value was 
still $1.40/.20 = $7.00 per share in each round.
A session lasted for 30 rounds, with 15 rounds in each treatment, High or Low 
Returns. The order was counter-balanced across sessions. Experimental earnings 
were paid at a rate of $100 experimental dollars = US $1. Subject payments were 
arranged within 24 h of the session completion. In New Zealand, subjects were given 
the opportunity to receive their cash payment (in equivalent NZ dollars correspond-
ing to US earnings12) as soon as the day after the experiment. The U.S. subjects were 
paid their earnings through PayPal within 24 h of the end of the session. Average 
asset market earnings for all participants were US $18.09 ± 8.55 (median $18.11). 
For the distinct treatments, earnings were US $3.81 ± 1.74 (median $3.60) for Low 
Returns and US $14.81 ± 7.24 (median $14.54) for High Returns. In addition, par-
ticipants received a guaranteed fixed participation compensation of US $10, $20, or 
$30 depending on whether the local time of day of the experiment session was noon 
or 4:00 pm ($10), 8:00 am or 8:00 pm ($20) or 4:00 am ($30) (see Note to Table 1).
Seventeen of our sessions involved traders in a single geographic location (East 
Coast, USA, or Auckland, New Zealand), while the other 12 sessions involved mar-
kets populated with traders from both of those locations, which were 16 time zones 
apart at the time of the experiment sessions (see Table 1 for details regarding the 
11 One of the sessions (Market 25, Appalachian State, 4:00 am) inadvertently used a dividend draw in 
the Low Returns treatment that allowed for a 1/10 chance of a zero dividend in just round 1 of the treat-
ment—dividends were explained to participants as based on the roll of a 10-sided die. Rather than rolls 
1–5 producing a $.40 dividend and rolls 6–10 producing a $1.00 dividend, the table showing the divi-
dend for each possible die outcome in round 1 listed a $0.00 dividend if the die roll was a 1. The realized 
dividend in that round was, in fact, the $1.00 high dividend, but this implies fundamental share value 
in the first round of that treatment for that one market was closer to $6.70 for round 1 and mechanically 
rising to $6.96 in round 10. The subjects correctly saw the intended dividend outcomes that would result 
from the die outcome as $.40 for rolls 1–5 and $1.00 for rolls 6–10 in rounds 2–10 and there is no evi-
dence this error, which was never realized in the dividend draw, affected behavior in any way.
12 At the times the experiments were carried out the exchange rate was between US $1 = NZ $1.38-
$1.47.
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session timing and locations). We label single-location markets as “local markets” 
while real-time trading with participants in both locations are what we call “global 
markets”. Notably, traders were not aware of other traders’ location and therefore 
had no idea that others might be in a different country (market interactions were all 
online) and/or have different alertness levels. Sessions took place at local times of 
12:00 noon, 4:00 pm, 8:00 pm, 12:00 midnight, 4:00 am, and 8:00 am at each loca-
tion (see Table 1 for full details on market sessions that includes location and num-
ber of subjects per location at the various local times-of-day). As noted above, deci-
sions were incentivized with payoffs that were a function of experimental earnings.
It is important that there is heterogeneity in the optimality of the local session 
time-of-day across subjects. Recall, the pre-experiment survey administers a vali-
dated short-form morningness–eveningness questionnaire. Evening-type subjects 
will generally possess a phase delay of roughly two hours relative to morning-type 
subjects in terms of their optimal alertness time-of-day. Smith et  al. (2002) high-
light the diurnal pattern of self-reported alertness ratings for individuals of differ-
ent diurnal preferences types. We adapt their methodology in Fig. 1 with a normal-
ized scale describing the level of sub-optimality of the local time of day, which we 
call mismatch level, or “MMlevel” ∈ [0,1]. The colored bands indicate clusters of 
high (red), medium (yellow), and low (green) predicted mismatch (MM) levels. We 
then construct a dichotomous variable HighMM = 1 for those with MMLevel ≥ 0.50. 
A s one can see from Fig. 1, this classifies as HighMM = 1 those subjects that fall 
within the high cluster (red band) of objective circadian mismatch levels in Fig. 1. 
Thus, this dichotomous variable captures the more significant difference between 
the objective circadian suboptimal timing of those within the red band (e.g., any-
one at 4:00 am, evening-types at 8:00 am, morning-types at midnight) compared to 
others.13 Our efforts in scoring such a variable using a validated diurnal preference 
measure and research-based alertness patterns reflects the focus of our study on the 
importance of objective time-of-day heterogeneity in our global markets.14 
An additional way to capture the circadian heterogeneity in each asset market 
group is to calculate a GINI coefficient that describes the inequality in circadian 
mismatch levels across the traders in that market. To do this, we define the Gini 
coefficient for a given market as:
(1)GINI =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1
���xi − xj
���
2n
∑n
i=1
xi
13 The validity of this methodology is documented in Sect. 5 of this paper. There may be an additional 
concern regarding selection of subjects into the different time slots of the experiment. While we do not 
have all measures that might be desired on which to assess sample selection, we formally tested for dif-
ferences in observable characteristics of our participants across the HighMM = 0 and HighMM = 1 partic-
ipants. We found no significant differences in gender, age, race, math level, Epworth sleepiness, anxiety 
risk, depression risk, or self-reported recent sleep deprivation across these two samples of participants 
(p > .10 in all instances: Mann–Whitney tests of medians).
14 In order to make sure that our results are not an artefact of this dichotomous classification of subjects 
into alert or sleepy categories, we also undertake a parallel analysis with the underlying continuous vari-
able MMLevel (bounded by zero and one) as the regressor of interest. We say more on this issue below in 
Footnote 18, when we present our results.
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where there are n traders in the market, and xi describes the circadian mismatch level 
of trader i in the market. This definition describes the GINI coefficient as half the 
relative mean absolute difference between all pairwise circadian mismatch values 
in the market, with circadian mismatch defined as in Fig.  1. Table 1 includes the 
circadian GINI coefficient of each market session, along with normalized measures 
that represent the distinct numerator and denominator terms of the GINI coefficient 
in (1). The numerator focuses on the circadian heterogeneity across traders in each 
market, while the denominator term describes the overall level of circadian mis-
match in the market. As can be seen at the bottom of Table 1, our global markets 
have a significantly higher circadian GINI coefficient compared to local markets, 
and the difference stems from circadian heterogeneity across traders and not from 
the mismatch levels across markets. While global markets have greater circadian 
heterogeneity, on average, notice in Table  1 that some local markets have greater 
circadian heterogeneity than some global markets; this is possible due to the mixture 
of morning-types, intermediate-types, and evening-types who are differentially mis-
matched at certain times-of-day. As such, when using a measure of market heteroge-
neity in our analysis, we will focus on the more descriptive market GINI coefficient 
rather than the dichotomous global versus local identifier of a market.
5  Results
Result 1 Circadian heterogeneity predicts bubble duration and share turnover, but 
this is limited to the High Returns treatment.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Evening-Types
Intermediate-Types
Morning-Types
MMlevel
Mismatch level, Based on self-report Alertness, (by chronotype)
HighMM = 1 is most mismatched (MMlevel > 0.5)
local me of day (24=midnight)
1 2119171513119753 23
Fig. 1  Guide for scoring of High Mismatch variable (colored bands represent the clusters of scored 
MMlevel in our data). (Color figure online)
Note: Graph adapted from alertness levels in Fig. 1 in Smith et al. (2002)
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The first of our three hypotheses, noted above, argues that markets with greater cir-
cadian mismatch heterogeneity will produce more significant asset price bubbles. 
In this section we look for evidence providing corroboration, or lack thereof, of this 
hypothesis. Figure 2 shows market trading prices across the 15 rounds of the Low 
Returns treatment. Panel A shows prices for local markets while Panel B does so for 
global markets. Figure 3 presents the corresponding information for local (Panel A) 
and global markets (Panel B) for the High Returns treatment. The thick black line 
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Fig. 2  Local versus global markets: prices across rounds in low returns treatment. (Color figure online)
Note: A gap in the market price graph typically indicates there were no shares traded in that period of 
that session. However, the gaps at price levels above $80 for some sessions in the global market data pan-
els (both in Figs. 2 and 3) are purely an artefact of our scaling the share price axis to a maximum of $80 
for consistency and legibility
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represents the average market price across all sessions shown in the same plot. It is 
clear from Figs. 2 and 3 that price bubbles are the norm in all markets we ran. It is 
less clear as to whether there are systematic differences between global and local 
markets. In order to explore this further, we focus our attention on the circadian 
GINI measure of a market, which best captures the degree of market level hetero-
geneity. As shown in Table 1 above, on average, global markets exhibit significantly 
higher levels of circadian heterogeneity, compared to local markets.
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Fig. 3  Local versus global markets: prices across rounds in high returns treatment. (Color figure online)
Note: Inadvertently, the High Returns treatment in Session 1 (local market) ran for 20 rounds instead 
of 15. While we include the market prices for rounds 1–15 of that session with other local market ses-
sions, we do not include these for further data analysis. Because the High Returns treatment followed low 
returns in that session, the low returns treatment data for that session are unaffected and therefore have 
been retained
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In order to test for mispricing at the market level, we focus on whether the circa-
dian GINI coefficient measure, as defined in Eq. (1), predicts market bubble activ-
ity. We examine the following bubble measures: (1) Maximum Price: the maximum 
market clearing share price in the market (across all rounds); (2) Bubble Duration: 
the longest run of market price increases across consecutive rounds; (3) Normalized 
average price deviation (NAPD): the sum of the absolute deviations of market price 
from fundamental share value for each trading round and (4) Turnover: transaction 
volume across all trading rounds relative to total available shares (see Palan 2013; 
Corgnet et al. 2015).
Table  2 shows results from log–log specification regressions estimating the 
impact of the market-level circadian GINI coefficient on the market-level bubble 
measure for that treatment (see Table A1 in online supplementary material for the 
bubble measures of each individual market). We choose to implement a log–log 
specification here, since that allows us to present these results as elasticities, which 
is an intuitive way of thinking about the relationship between the GINI coefficient 
and the bubble measure. It allows us to ask: what is the percentage change in a par-
ticular measure given a 1% increase in the Gini? These regressions consider the 
market as the independent observation, and so we are somewhat limited in the statis-
tical power of such market-level estimations.
Results from Table  2 show a significant impact of circadian heterogene-
ity in the High Returns treatment on two of the bubble measures: bubble dura-
tion and turnover. Estimates indicate that a 100% increase in the circadian GINI 
of a market (which is not abnormal across our market-level GINI coefficients; 
see Table 1), is predicted to increase bubble duration by 22% (approximately 3 
rounds of our 15-round treatment). A similar increase in market-level GINI pre-
dicts an increase in share turnover of 11%, which is an indicator of increased mar-
ket volume of trades. This latter finding is in line with the results in Michailova 
and Schmidt (2016), who find larger bubbles and increased trade volume in high-
overconfidence markets. The fact that we estimate these effects only in the High 
Returns treatment imply that, at least in our laboratory environment, heterogene-
ity may only manifest at the market level when conditions are conducive to large 
valuation bubbles. We therefore describe this as limited support for Hypothesis 
Table 2  Circadian GINI impact on the log asset market bubble measures (n = 28 markets)
Market 1 inadvertently administered 20 rounds of High Returns and is therefore excluded from analysis
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
Low returns
Coefficients (SE)
High returns
Coefficients (SE)
Variable Max 
price
Bubble 
duration
NAPD Turnover Max 
price
Bubble 
duration
NAPD Turnover
Constant 3.460***
(0.221)
1.934***
(0.257)
4.926***
(0.266)
0.208***
(0.168)
3.645***
(0.249)
2.415***
(0.261)
5.424***
(0.257)
0.443***
(0.13)
Log(Gini) 0.022
(0.084)
0.046
(0.097)
− 0.055
(0.101)
0.085
(0.064)
− 0.023
(0.094)
0.22***
(0.099)
− 0.008
(0.097)
0.110***
(0.049)
R-squared .0027 .0087 .0112 .0640 .0022 .1606 .0003 .1620
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1; markets with higher circadian heterogeneity do lead to larger bubbles using at 
least two of our four metrics, but this is true only for the high returns treatment.
Result 2 Traders at more suboptimal times of day hold riskier asset portfolios and 
are more likely to engage in asset mispricing.
Hypothesis 1 and Result 1 above look at aggregate market level outcomes; 
whether markets with greater circadian heterogeneity exhibit larger bubbles. We 
now turn to an in-depth analysis of our second hypothesis above, which relates to 
individual trader-level decisions. Hypothesis 2 suggests that traders who are at 
sub-optimal times of day will behave differently than those who are operating at 
more optimal times. More specifically, the former (“tired” traders) will engage in 
greater asset mispricing and will also hold on to shares deeper into the game, a 
risky strategy given the inevitable market collapse.
We start by looking at average share holdings at different points in the market’s 
15-period life for subjects who are likely to be at a circadian suboptimal time of day
as opposed to those who are not. For this we use the classification of circadian mis-
match level, MMLevel, as defined above in Fig. 1 of Sect. 4. This variable combines
both time-of-day and diurnal preference of each trader. For example, the most subop-
timal time in our data set (e.g., anyone trading at a 4:00 am local time-of-day, as well
as evening-types at 8:00 am or morning types at midnight), we consider as highly cir-
cadian mismatched, or HighMM = 1. These are all traders with MMLevel ≥ 0.50. The 
rest of the traders have MMlevel < 0.50 and are classified as HighMM = 0. One can 
see from Fig. 1 that there is a gap in MMlevel of our traders between what we score as
HighMM = 0 and 1. For ease of exposition, we will often refer to HighMM =1 traders
as “tired” or “sleepy” and the HighMM =0 traders as “alert”.
This classification approach ignores any compensatory behaviors of the sub-
ject to combat sleepiness, for which we did not collect data. While this may 
seem a limitation in our data, we document the validity of this approach using 
the common 9-point Karolinska self-reported sleepiness rating scale (or KSS, 
see Åkerstedt and Gillberg 1990). For the KSS, 1 = lowest and 9 = highest sleepi-
ness rating. This information is elicited in the online survey administered imme-
diately prior to the asset market trading experiment. Using data from all of our 
29 experimental sessions (n = 303 total subjects), we report a significantly higher 
self-reported sleepiness among HighMM = 1 subjects (n = 81, KSS = 6.06 ± 1.57) 
compared to the HighMM = 0 subjects (n = 222, KSS = 4.92 ± 1.78) using the non-
parametric Mann–Whitney two-sample test of medians (z = − 4.961; p < 0.01).
Our global markets are those with the most intra-market heterogeneity in cir-
cadian mismatch levels, on average, due to the different local times of day for the 
traders in those markets. While time-of-day describes the typical main source of 
circadian heterogeneity in a market, recall that traders with different diurnal prefer-
ence (e.g., morning-types versus evening-types) imply that circadian heterogeneity 
may yet vary in a local market where all traders are at the same local time-of-day. 
Our primary analysis includes both global and local markets data. We first focus on 
share-holdings in our examination of Hypothesis 2.
541
1 3
Trading while sleepy? Circadian mismatch and mispricing in…
Figure 4 shows average share holdings of tired and alert subjects pooled across 
sessions for a given round and treatment in all markets including those with a high 
or low degree of circadian mismatch. Not only are shares riskier than cash in this 
market experiment, but shares held late into the game are riskier than at other times 
in the life of the market. We divide up the 15 rounds in each treatment (low or high 
returns) into early rounds (Rounds 1–8) and late rounds (Rounds 9–15).
The upper panels of Fig. 4 show the patterns of share-holdings across rounds for 
the more heterogeneous markets (those with market level GINI coefficient above the 
median GINI coefficient), while the lower panel shows this for the less heterogene-
ous half of our sample (those with GINI coefficient below the median). Visually, one 
can see an apparent difference in share-holdings across rounds that exists only in 
Panel A: high circadian Gini markets —low returns and high Returns treatments
Panel B: low circadian Gini markets—low returns and high returns treatments
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Low Returns--High Gini 
markets
LowMM (n=120)
HighMM (n=30)
round within treatment
avg shares 
held
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
High Returns--High Gini 
markets
LowMM (n=120)
HighMM (n=30)
round within treatment
avg shares 
held
(Market 1 excluded)
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Low Returns--Low Gini 
markets
LowMM (n=102)
HighMM (n=51)
round within treatment
avg shares 
held
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
High Returns--Low Gini 
markets
LowMM (n=93)
HighMM (n=51)
round within treatment
avg shares 
held
(Market 1 excluded)
Fig. 4  Portfolio Share holdings by treatment and market Gini level
Notes: Data are pooled across all traders and markets. Data for shareholding patterns omit Market 1 from 
High Returns panels due to the fact that this treatment, which occurred after the Low Returns treatment 
in that market, was inadvertently administered for 20 rounds (instead of the usual 15). Market 1 was a 
Low GINI market and so exclusion of Market 1 does not reduce observations for the High GINI High 
Returns panel
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the more heterogeneous half. In these more heterogeneous markets, it appears that 
tired subjects hold more shares on average in the late rounds compared to the early 
rounds, which is a riskier portfolio in general (compared to cash in the experiment, 
which earns a certain interest rate).
It is worth highlighting again that the set of high circadian mismatch markets 
does not coincide exactly with the set of global markets. There are some local mar-
kets that exhibit higher circadian heterogeneity compared to some global markets 
(see Table 1). So, the set of high circadian mismatch markets is made up of mostly 
global with some local markets. Likewise, the majority of the low circadian mis-
match markets are local markets, albeit not all of them.
While it may appear from panel B that HighMM = 0 and HighMM = 1 traders have 
similar share-holding patterns across rounds, keep in mind that, in the low GINI 
coefficient markets, the HighMM = 1 traders are typically not in the same market as 
the HighMM = 0 traders. In other words, panel B pools across markets and includes 
data from local markets at 4:00 am as well as local markets during the day (e.g., 
noon), both of which have low heterogeneity across traders in the markets: some 
markets contain all HighMM = 1 traders (the 4:00 am markets) and others contain-
ing all HighMM = 0 traders (the noon or 8:00 pm markets). In the High GINI mar-
kets, HighMM = 0 and HighMM = 1 traders are typically in the same market, which 
implies that the fixed numbers of shares per market may trade hands from alert to 
sleepy traders as seen in late round trend.
Figure 4 is therefore meant to display the apparent importance of a market’s cir-
cadian heterogeneity in share-holding patterns. It appears that differences arise when 
circadian mismatched traders are on the presence of less circadian mismatched trad-
ers who make take advantage of these different (riskier) trading strategy preferences. 
We now turn to using regression analysis to provide more rigorous corroboration of 
some of these findings.
Table 3 presents results from random effects regressions for share-holding pat-
terns, split into estimations using the subset of high circadian heterogeneity mar-
kets (markets with GINI coefficient greater than the median; to the left) and low 
circadian heterogeneity markets (markets with GINI coefficient smaller than the 
median; to the right). The results are presented separately for the High versus Low 
Returns treatments, and in each case, we present two specifications. The parsimoni-
ous specification includes the dummy variable HighMM (= 1 for those with high cir-
cadian mismatch, MMLevel > 0.5; 0 otherwise), another dummy LateRound (= 1 if 
Round > 8; 0 otherwise), an interaction term between HighMM and LateRound, and 
a constant. The alternative specification adds the following control variables to the 
ones in the first specification: Female (dummy variable; 1 for women and 0 for men), 
MathGood (dummy variable: MathGood = 1 if subject’s self-reported math level 
out of High School is high15; Epworth (daytime sleepiness scores; higher scores 
15 The scoring of MathGood = 1 accounted for differences in the average math levels of New Zealand 
versus U.S. students. Specifically, we asked subjects to self-report their grade in the last high school math 
course they took. Taking into account the different grading standards, we scored 45% of the U.S. subjects 
(n = 85 of 187 total US participants) as MathGood = 1 and 55% of the New Zealand subjects (n = 62 of 
116 total NZ participants) as MathGood = 1.
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indicating greater daytime sleepiness over last 2  weeks)16; PerSD (self-reported 
levels of personal sleep deprivation over the previous week; higher scores indicate 
greater sleep deprivation), and Experience (dummy variable Experience = 1 implies 
the second treatment within a particular asset market session, given that each trader 
experiences both a high returns and a low returns treatment). When Experience = 1, 
this implies that the trader has already experienced 15 rounds of an asset market 
either with high or low returns and (likely) market-level mispricing prior to this. 
Throughout we find that our main findings do not change when controls are included 
in the relevant regressions.
The results in Table  3 corroborate the findings reported in Fig.  4. First, sub-
optimal time-of-day traders hold more shares in later rounds compared to other 
traders. To see this, first note that the average number of shares held late in the 
game by an alert trader is given by (constant + LateRound), whereas the average 
number of shares held late in the game by a sleepy trader is (constant + LateR-
ound + HighMM + HighMM*LateRound). Thus if (HighMM + HighMM*LateRound) 
is significantly greater than zero, tired subjects hold more shares than alert subjects in 
later rounds. In all model specifications, (HighMM + HighMM*LateRound) is posi-
tive, and the Wald test on the linear restriction (HighMM + HighMM*LateRound)= 0 
can be rejected at a 5% level for the High Returns treatment, and marginally rejected 
in the Low Returns treatment (significance of the Wald test at 5% or better is shown 
in bold, while significance at 10% or better is italicized).
Secondly, the suboptimal time-of-day traders increase their shareholdings 
between early and late rounds. To see this, first note that the average number of 
shares held early in the game by a sleepy trader is given by (constant + HighMM), 
whereas the average number of shares held late in the game by a sleepy trader is 
(constant + LateRound + HighMM +HighMM*LateRound). Thus, if (LateR-
ound + HighMM*LateRound) is significantly greater than zero, tired subjects 
increase shareholdings on average between early and late rounds. This also supports 
Hypothesis 2. In all specifications, (LateRound + HighMM*LateRound) is positive, 
and the Wald test on the linear restriction (LateRound + HighMM*LateRound) = 0 
can be rejected at a 5% level.17
As expected, these results only manifest in markets with higher circadian hetero-
geneity. The estimations in Table 3, therefore, highlight that the circadian mismatch 
level of a trader only predicts riskier shareholdings patterns when that trader is in a 
market with other traders who are less circadian mismatched. We have also noted 
earlier that global markets, on average, tend to exhibit higher degrees of circadian 
heterogeneity. Therefore, we expect this tendency to hold shares deeper into the 
17 Unfortunately, we did not elicit beliefs from traders regarding expected dividend outcomes or asset 
prices, which would have helped to discriminate between the different potential mechanisms that could 
all contribute to tired subjects holding more shares in later rounds. For example, though tired subjects are 
predicted to be both more overconfident in holding shares and also less able to anticipate a market down-
turn, our data may not be sufficient to distinguish between these two mechanisms. However, earnings 
analysis we conduct later in this section may help identify whether risk taking plays an important role 
independent of anticipation and overconfidence.
16 The Epworth Sleepiness Scale (Johns 1991) is often used in sleep studies.
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game to also manifest itself more in global markets. We present results separately 
for global and local markets in supplementary online material (Table A2). This table 
corroborates the results from Table 3; i.e., in global markets, tired traders hold more 
shares in later rounds.18
In Table 4, we report results of random effects regressions for individual share 
mispricing, which measures the extent to which the individual’s trading behavior 
contributes to mispricing of the asset in the market. Here, we hypothesized that mis-
pricing in asset markets will likely result from our underlying behavioral hypotheses 
of how circadian suboptimal timing will impact portfolio choices. We define Mis-
pricing as:
The intuition behind Mispricing is to construct a variable that would allow us to 
examine whether sleepy or alert traders were more responsible for pushing prices 
up. Note that this version of mispricing is taken to be relative to the previous round 
price rather than fundamental share value of $7, and is weighted by the number of 
shares demanded/offered. Market prices almost always trade above fundamental 
value in our markets, and this bias measure will better capture bid/ask behavior that 
feeds or deflates the market level mispricing. Specifically, positive values of mis-
pricing are pushing the bubble higher, while negative values bring it back towards 
the fundamental value. The use of both bid and ask prices in our mispricing meas-
ure is appropriate given that the Veconlab software call auction rules dictate market 
prices at the midpoint of the bid-ask spread for mutually beneficial trades—thus, 
both bid and ask prices can bid up market prices in our environment.
We undertake the same comparisons in Table  4 as in Table  3.19 First, 
we find evidence in the High Returns treatments that circadian mismatched 
traders misprice share more than do the more alert traders in later trad-
ing rounds in both the high and low circadian heterogeneity markets (tests of 
HighMM + HighMM*LateRd = 0). The estimated effect size is, however, much 
larger in the highly heterogeneous markets compared to the low heterogeneity 
markets. This share mispricing result is also found in the Low Returns treatment 
in the low circadian heterogeneity markets, although the effect is less precisely 
estimated and smaller in magnitude.
Secondly, we find that tired traders increase their own bid and offer prices as 
the game progresses in the High Returns treatment in high circadian heterogeneity 
(2)QBidt ∗
(
BidPricet − Pricet−1
)
+ QAskt ∗
(
AskPricet − Pricet−1
)
18 As noted earlier, we also replicate all our results replacing the HighMM dummy with the underlying 
continuous variable MMLevel ∈[0,1]. These results are similar to those in Table 3, except that for mar-
kets with heterogeneity above the median, we get significant differences in the High Returns treatment 
when using HighMM in Table 3 but we do not get significant differences in the High Returns treatment 
when we use MMLevel. We still get similar significant differences in the Low Returns treatment. As in 
Table 3 we do not find any significant differences in the markets below the median if we use MMLevel. 
In the interest of parsimony, we do not present these results in detail, but they are available from the cor-
responding author upon request.
19 Reduced observations in the Table  4 regressions (compared to Table  3) are due both to the use of 
lagged terms in constructing the mispricing measures and the fact that some rounds did not produce a 
market price observation if no shares were traded.
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markets (test of LateRound + HighMM*LateRd =0). The general trend among 
alert traders is to misprice to a lesser extent in late rounds of trading (LateR-
ound coefficient uniformly negative and significant in all specifications), but at 
least in some instances sleepy traders display the opposite tendency. This is most 
notable in the significant increase in mispricing in the High Returns treatment 
of high circadian heterogeneity market. In that case, the circadian mismatched 
traders reverse their own tendency to decreasingly misprice shares with each 
passing round, which is the general tendency of all traders. In sum, our Table 4 
results show varied evidence regarding whether circadian mismatched traders 
exhibit increased mispricing tendencies in later rounds compared to themselves 
in the early rounds, but we find consistent evidence that in the High Returns 
treatments sleepy traders misprice in late rounds more than alert traders in late 
rounds (Hypothesis 2). The general findings in Tables 3 and 4 are limited to High 
Returns treatments, which is consistent with the market level bubble impacts in 
Table 2 also being confined to the High Returns treatment.
As in the case of Table 3, supplementary online material (Table A3) contains 
results for mispricing from global and local markets. The results are similar. 
Global markets, which are typically more heterogeneous, show evidence of cir-
cadian mismatched traders driving mispricing, except there is some evidence of 
tired traders mispricing in local markets as well. We also undertook a robustness 
test using MMLevel instead of HighMM and the results are very similar to that 
presented in Table 4 (available on request).
Result 3 Circadian mismatched traders earn less. This effect is significant and 
strongest in markets with the highest circadian GINI coefficients (i.e., the most cir-
cadian heterogeneous markets).
Our third and final hypothesis is that traders operating at sub-optimal times of 
the day will earn less. In Table 5, we present random effects regressions for log 
final earnings, i.e., cumulative earnings for each trader at the very end of the ses-
sion. Once again, the regressor of primary interest is HighMM, the dummy which 
takes the value of 1 for traders at sub-optimal times of day (tired) traders. If our 
hypothesis is correct, then we expect a negative and significant coefficient for this 
dummy, indicating that tired traders earn less in the experiment. We present three 
different sets of results for markets where the Circadian GINI (the market level 
measure of heterogeneity in mismatch) is (1) above the median; (2) in the top-
third (top tercile) and (3) in the top quartile. In each case we present results sepa-
rately for Low Returns and High Returns treatments. For each treatment, we pre-
sent results for two regression specifications: a parsimonious specification which 
includes only the HighMM dummy and a constant and a second full model which 
includes other control variables. The controls in Table 5 are the same as those in 
Tables 3 and 4 (and are also explained beneath the table). Analogous results for 
markets with Circadian GINI below the median, in the lower tercile and the lower 
quartile as well as for global and local markets is available in the online supple-
mentary materials (Tables A4 and A5, respectively).
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The evidence presented in Table  5 shows that tired traders earn less, and this 
result is particularly pronounced for markets with relatively high degree of circadian 
mismatch; i.e., markets with circadian GINI in top tercile or top quartile. First, we 
look at market with Circadian GINI above the median. Here, while the sign of the 
HighMM dummy is always negative, none of these rises to conventional levels of 
significance. But from that point on, as we move to markets with greater heteroge-
neity, i.e., those in the top third or top quarter for the GINI coefficient for circadian 
mismatch, the coefficient for the HighMM dummy becomes negative and significant. 
If we look only at the markets in the top quarter, i.e., those markets with circiadian 
GINI greater than 0.16, then, on average, tired traders may be earning approximately 
a third less than alert traders, which is consistent with Hypothesis 3.
In supplementary online material (Table  A4), we present earnings results for 
markets with limited heterogeneity in circadian mismatch. These are markets, whose 
circadian GINI are located (1) below the median; (2) in the bottom tercile and (3) 
in the bottom quartile. It is clear that we do not see any evidence of earnings differ-
entials between tired and alert traders in these markets. This is most likely because 
traders in these markets are at similar levels of circadian mismatch and therefore, 
there are no alert traders to take advantage of the cognitive deficiencies of the sleep-
ier traders.
In supplementary online material (Table A5), we present the results for earnings 
broken up by local and global markets. However, final earnings are not significantly 
different between local and global markets. So, while earnings for tired traders are 
significantly lower than those for alert traders in markets with a higher degree of 
circadian heterogeneity, we do not find these differences mirrored in global markets. 
This somewhat qualifies our evidence in support of Hypothesis 3, and can be due to 
at least a couple of reasons. First, recall that not all global markets have higher-than-
median circadian mismatch across our market sessions. Focusing on markets in the 
top tercile and quartile of circadian heterogeneity eliminates local markets as well as 
the not-so-heterogeneous global markets. Second, it is possible that the flat funda-
mental share-value design we have implemented masks some earnings differences 
that would more readily appear in a declining fundamental value paradigm.20
6  Conclusion
We explore an under-appreciated characteristic of global financial markets in the 
sense that some traders engaged in these markets are making decisions at sub-
optimal times of day. This implies variations in the circadian timing of decisions, 
which may be an important heterogeneity in the cognition of traders that is present 
20 The earnings regressions we report contain data for 294 participants rather that 303. This is because, 
as noted in Table 3 above, the very first session, a local session with 9 participants had 20 rounds in the 
High Returns treatment as opposed to the required 15. We have taken out this session in looking at final 
earnings resulting in dropping 9 participants, thereby reducing the number of observations from 303 to 
294.
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particularly in global markets. At the aggregate level, we found that this heteroge-
neity in circadian mismatch of traders predicts, at least, some aggregate market-
level measures of mispricing, such as longer duration of asset price bubbles or 
greater turnover volume. This is particularly true in a higher cash (greater liquid-
ity) environment (High Returns) that tends to produce larger bubbles in general. 
At the individual trader level, we found that, when market mismatch heterogene-
ity is high, those trading at sub-optimal times-of-day tended to engage in differ-
ent trading behaviors than those trading at more favorable times. The tired traders 
tended to hold shares (the risky asset) deeper into the market trading rounds. They 
also exhibit a greater degree of mispricing of shares, in the sense that their bid 
and ask prices in any round were further above the market price in the previous 
round. These effects are most robust in the High Returns treatment and in markets 
that display more circadian heterogeneity across traders. We also find evidence that 
these tired traders earn less, especially in markets that have the most circadian het-
erogeneity. This implies that tired trader strategies are suboptimal and can be effec-
tively exploited by more alert traders in a way that directly impacts trader earnings 
and potentially market level outcomes. As noted before, these differences between 
trader types arise when circadian mismatched traders are in the presence of less 
circadian mismatched traders who can effectively exploit riskier trading strategies.
We note several distinct behavioral mechanisms that may point to similar pre-
dictions regarding trader behavior. Though our data are not sufficient to provide 
direct evidence for testing between different mechanisms, the data are more con-
sistent with a mechanism of decreased anticipation and/or increased overconfi-
dence generating the shareholding patterns we observe. Results in Lei et al. (2001) 
suggest irrationality of traders may drive speculative bubbles and, to some, our 
data may suggest irrationality among tired traders. Yet, the relatively mild sleepi-
ness generated in our protocol has been previously shown to impact the riskiness 
in chosen asset bundles in an individual choice task (Castillo et al. 2017). Riskier 
portfolio choice in the present experiment does not, however, explain late-round 
share purchases at inflated prices when history has shown little chance of resale 
for capital gain. This feature of our data is more consistent with a mechanism of 
decreased anticipation (theory of mind) and/or increased overconfidence among 
sleepier traders to generate the observed patterns in shareholdings and mispricing.
Others have theoretically argued that the failure of rational arbitrageurs to 
coordinate selling activity may also cause bubbles to persist (Abreu and Brunner-
meier 2003). This may imply yet another mechanism to explore in light of other 
recent findings that suggest sleepiness may increase the likelihood of coordina-
tion failure (Castillo and Dickinson 2018). Recent results showing intra-day trad-
ing patterns that could be due to heterogeneity in trader information processing 
(Gao et al. 2018) may also be consistent with heterogeneity in trader sleepiness. 
A different experimental design may be required of future research in order to 
more directly examine the cognitive underpinnings of sleepy trader decisions and 
assess which components are most impacted when sleepy in order to answer some 
of these deeper questions.
To what extent are these results generalizable to real life global asset markets? 
Is it not the case that in actual markets those trading at sub-optimal times are 
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self-selected and, therefore, better able to handle any potential circadian mismatch? 
We believe that these concerns are unfounded. For one thing, even among our sub-
jects there was a degree of self-selection; subjects were free to choose their session 
time-slots and it is likely that the ones who thought they could handle the adverse 
time-of-day sessions were more likely to select into those sessions. This actually 
implies our results would be a conservative estimate of the true impact of subopti-
mal times-of-day on trading decisions (i.e., the traders at the most suboptimal times-
of-day would be those who felt they could handle it best). The point here is that a 
measure of self-selection in our experimental subjects somewhat mimics a feature of 
naturally occurring field data on trader behavior.
But more fundamentally we are making two points. First, the presence of circadian 
mismatch and heterogeneity in local times-of-day across traders is a feature that looms 
larger for global markets than for local markets. This may lead to differences in mar-
ket-level outcomes. Second, those operating at sub-optimal times of day will engage 
in differential trading strategies that may involve riskier portfolio choices or behaviors 
otherwise symptomatic of cognitive impairment. In the presence of other more alert 
traders, these sleepy traders may be exploited and experience a negative impact on 
earnings. It is our hope that the effects of circadian state, and how markets with greater 
circadian heterogeneity may magnify trading behavior differences, will stimulate fur-
ther interest in examining different types of cognitive heterogeneity in asset markets.
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